Heterogeneus Networks for IoT

The critical industrial processes powered by heavy machinery are crucial to the growth and achievement of business outcomes. However, due to the large size and complexity of the specialized machines, their maintenance cost is high. Moreover, any breakdown of these machines brings the industrial processes to an unexpected halt, resulting in opportunity costs. Also, an optimal operation of the machinery is a critical factor as a poorly functioning machine, resulting in higher expenses for each process in the industry. Their sensitivity towards time characterizes the industrial processes. Therefore, any delay beyond the processess’ limits further results in poor production quality and may even result in a catastrophe such as the overheating of systems, an explosion of tanks due to excessive pressure, and others. Each business relies on its manufacturing, trade, and operation secrets. Thus, any breach of sensitive data leads to monetary losses and a rise in market competition. Also, to prevent critical and hazardous systems under limited access, industrial systems demand effective security measures. At SWAN Laboratory, we focus on the practical requirements of the industries to help them minimize the process costs, effortless and remote monitoring of machinery, remote manual and automatic actuation of systems, real-time alerts, and others. In addition, we exploit the tremendous potential of IoT backed by Edge computing and Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning to develop systems that meet the essential characteristics of time boundedness and security.

 

Procurement-Based User Association for LTE-Advanced HetNets

This paper presents a procurement-based user association scheme for LTE-Advanced HetNets. The proposed scheme enables LTE Macrocell (LMC) to leverage capacity from Femtocells (FCs) and fulfills the excess demand of the registered LMC (rLMC) users. Additionally, we propose an energy-efficient and QoS-ensured resource allocation scheme for rLMC users.

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Joint Content Sharing and Incentive Mechanism for Cache-Enabled Device-to-Device Networks

In this paper, we analyze the interaction among participating cache-enabled D2D users and determine their caching, sharing, and reward decisions to minimize the users’ total cost. We model the interaction among the D2D users as a multi-person bargaining game and design a novel incentive mechanism using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) approach.

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Enabling Multi-Source Device-to-Device Content Delivery in Cellular Networks

In this paper, we investigate the economic interaction between single base-station (BS) and multiple content owners (COs) for content delivery. We model the interaction among the BS and multiple COs as one-to-many bargaining game and design an incentive mechanism based on the Nash bargaining framework.

Read More PDF Citation

Procurement-Based User Association for LTE-Advanced HetNets

This paper presents a procurement-based user association scheme for LTE-Advanced HetNets. The proposed scheme enables LTE Macrocell (LMC) to leverage capacity from Femtocells (FCs) and fulfills the excess demand of the registered LMC (rLMC) users. Additionally, we propose an energy-efficient and QoS-ensured resource allocation scheme for rLMC users.

Read More PDF Citation

Joint Content Sharing and Incentive Mechanism for Cache-Enabled Device-to-Device Networks

In this paper, we analyze the interaction among participating cache-enabled D2D users and determine their caching, sharing, and reward decisions to minimize the users’ total cost. We model the interaction among the D2D users as a multi-person bargaining game and design a novel incentive mechanism using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) approach.

Read More PDF Citation

Enabling Multi-Source Device-to-Device Content Delivery in Cellular Networks

In this paper, we investigate the economic interaction between single base-station (BS) and multiple content owners (COs) for content delivery. We model the interaction among the BS and multiple COs as one-to-many bargaining game and design an incentive mechanism based on the Nash bargaining framework.

Read More PDF Citation