

# Temporal privacy/deletion privacy

Mainack Mondal

CS 60081  
Autumn 2021



# Roadmap

- Passwords/multi factor authentications
- Usability for security developers
- Online tracking
- **Temporal aspect of privacy**
- Privacy notices/dark patterns

**Temporal Privacy: Changing privacy settings**

# Need to revisit old privacy settings

## 2009




Privacy setting: **“all friends”**



# Need to revisit old privacy settings

## 2009



Undergraduate friends

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
## 2019



Privacy setting: **“all friends”** !!

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


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
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Graduate school friends

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Undergraduate friends


Graduate school friends

Professional colleagues

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


Privacy setting: **“all friends”** !!

Issue: Users take a “**set-it-and-forget-it**” approach to privacy settings for social media posts

Need: Retrospectively manage privacy

# Retrospective privacy management is difficult




Undergraduate friends





# Retrospective privacy management is difficult



Students



Undergraduate friends

Graduate school friends

Professional colleagues



# State of the art

No proposal for a predictive model or mechanism

[Bauer et al. 2013]  
[Ayalon et al. 2013]

## Limit The Audience for Old Posts on Your Timeline

If you choose to limit your past posts, posts on your timeline that you've shared with Friends of friends, and Public posts, will now be shared only with Friends. Anyone tagged in these posts, and their friends, may also still see these posts.

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Limit Past Posts

## Privacy Checkup



Hi Charlie!

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No Thanks

Let's Do It!

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**Limit Past Posts**

**Privacy Checkup**



**Hi Charlie!**

We have a new tool that helps you quickly review a few of your privacy settings to make sure they're set up the way you want.

It should take a minute or two to use. Do you want to check it out?

Focus of our study

Measure privacy activity and preferences

Predictive models for retrospective privacy management

# Assisting users in temporal privacy management

Our data collection approach

Privacy settings and friend network over time

Preferences for changing privacy settings

Automated classifiers

# Assisting users in temporal privacy management

## **Our data collection approach**

Privacy settings and friend network over time


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Automated classifiers

# Study overview




Privacy-preserving  
data-collection  
Infrastructure



amazon  
mechanical turk

78 Facebook users



Two surveys

# Generic survey



Overall Facebook usage over time

- —
- —
- —




Use of Facebook's privacy features

- —
- —





Participant demographics

- —








# Consent process



# Data collection process



# Data collection process



Programmatic  
No humans ever view raw HTML

Hash names and IDs;  
No images collected

Never access  
friends' profiles


# Facebook Timeline data



```
1 {
2   "user": "23765ae45...",
3   "timestamp": "May 26, 2009",
4   "privacy": "friends",
5   "numLikes": 5,
6   "numComments": 18,
7   "Text": "When we were young",
8   "post_url": https://facebook.com/...,
9   "commentObjects" : [
10    {
11      "user": "877326d4f...",
12      "text": "You look funny",
13      "timestamp": "...",
14      ...
15    }
16  ]
17  .....
18 }
```

**Chose not to store images!**

# Facebook Activity Log data



The screenshot shows the Facebook Activity Log interface. On the left is a navigation menu with categories like Photos and Videos, Likes and Reactions, Comments, Profile, Friends, and Added Friends. The main content area displays a list of activities, grouped by date. A blue arrow points from the 'Added Friends' section to the JSON data on the right.

Date	Activity
OCTOBER 30	Mainack Mondal became friends with Blase Ur. (Oct 31, 2018, 6:57 AM)
OCTOBER 26	Mainack Mondal became friends with Michael Tang.
OCTOBER 13	Mainack Mondal became friends with Noah Hirsch.
OCTOBER 10	Mainack Mondal became friends with Christopher Tran.
OCTOBER 5	

```
1 {
2   "activityType": "addfriends",
3   "user": "23765ae45...",
4   "friend": "3264325ef...",
5   "timestamp": "Oct 31, 2018"
6 }
7 {
8   "activityType": "addfriends",
9   "user": "23765ae45...",
10  "friend": "85e47873...",
11  "timestamp": "Oct 26, 2018"
12 }
13 ...
```

**ALL Facebook activities by user  
(friendship, likes, comments,...)**

# Post-specific survey

1. Desired privacy settings for 5 random posts per user

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Click [here to see Post 1](#). Current privacy setting: Public



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Keep same setting

Change setting to:

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]



Delete



# Post-specific survey

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Click [here to see Post 1](#). Current privacy setting: Public



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Why?

# Post-specific survey

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**This question concerns [Post 1](#) and one of your Facebook friends: [Blase Ur](#)**  
**You can visit Blase Ur's profile by clicking his picture:**



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You can visit Blase Ur's profile by clicking his picture:



Keep sharing post 1  
with Blase Ur



Stop sharing post 1  
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You can visit Blase Ur's profile by clicking his picture:



Keep sharing post 1  
with Blase Ur



Stop sharing post 1  
with Blase Ur

Why?

# Demographics



AMT workers from US

69% identified as female

46% reported age 25-34

18% reported CS background

# Facebook usage

	<b>Total</b>	<b>Median</b>
Account age (Years)	-	10
#Friends	-	224
#Timeline posts	253,122	1,840
#Activity log entries	1,738,303	20,263

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Active users with old accounts and lots of posts



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Active users with old accounts and lots of posts

67% reported reduced Facebook usage over time

# Assisting users in temporal privacy management


Our data collection approach

## **Privacy settings and friend network over time**


Preferences for changing privacy settings

Automated classifiers


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


# Privacy settings over time




Majority of old posts are shared with all “friends”


# Change in number of friends



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


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




# Change in number of friends



# Change in number of friends



Substantial change in the meaning of “friends” privacy setting

# Assisting users in temporal privacy management

Our data collection approach

Privacy settings and friend network over time

## **Preferences for changing privacy settings**

Automated classifiers

# Desired privacy setting for old posts

Post-specific survey: **Desired privacy setting for 390 random posts**

# Desired privacy setting for old posts

Post-specific survey: **Desired privacy setting for 390 random posts**

Current setting	<u>Desired setting</u>						
	Public	Friends+	Friends	Custom	Only Me	Custom (Decreased)	Delete
Public	58	-	3	-	-	-	1
Friends+	3	27	3	-	-	-	-
Friends	21	4	177	3	5	-	31
Custom	6	2	9	19	1	2	4
Only Me	-	-	-	-	9	-	1

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Participants **desire to change audience for 25%** of old posts!

# Desired privacy setting for old posts

Post-specific survey: **Desired privacy setting for 390 random posts**

Desire to limit audience: 54 posts

Desired setting

Current setting	Public	Friends+	Friends	Custom	Only Me	Custom (Decreased)	Delete
Public	58	-	3	-	-	-	1
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Only Me	-	-	-	-	9	-	1

Desire to increase audience: 45 posts

Participants **desire to change audience for 25%** of old posts!

# Effectiveness of Facebook's privacy tools

## Limit The Audience for Old Posts on Your Timeline

If you choose to limit your past posts, posts on your timeline that you've shared with Friends of friends, and Public posts, will now be shared only with Friends. Anyone tagged in these posts, and their friends, may also still see these posts.

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[Limit Past Posts](#)

## Privacy Checkup



Hi Charlie!

We have a new tool that helps you quickly review a few of your privacy settings to make sure they're set up the way you want.

It should take a minute or two to use. Do you want to check it out?

No Thanks

Let's Do It!

Found no significant correlation between usage of these tools and the desire to change posts' privacy settings



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**Automated classifiers**

# A human-in-the-loop design

## Inspiration

People You May Know

	<b>John Doe</b> Johnny Doe and 14 other mutual friends
	<b>Jenny Doe</b> Jane Doe and 6 other mutual friends
	<b>Matt Doe</b> Robert Doe and 41 other mutual friends
	<b>Julia Doe</b> Robert Doe and 40 other mutual friends
	<b>Judith Doe</b> Robert Doe and 35 other mutual friends

# A human-in-the-loop design

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## Our vision

Stop sharing



Mainack Mondal  
August 19, 2008  
is procrastinating  
Like Comment

with



Stop sharing




Mainack Mondal  
March 22, 2011  
is feeling dumb.  
10 Comments  
Like Comment Share

with



Stop sharing



Mainack Mondal  
November 14, 2011  
I have lost the will to live.  
Like Comment Share  
Write a comment... Comment Share

with



# Prediction task

Prediction task

**Predict if a user wants to “stop sharing” a given post with a given friend**

Output

List of friend-post pairs ordered by probability

Ground truth

Privacy decisions for 78 participants x 5 posts X 6 friends = 2,340 pairs

# Features for prediction

<b>User-specific</b>	#friends, age of the account, life change, Facebook privacy tool usage, user age, CS-background
<b>Post metadata</b>	Age of the post, #likes, #comments, previous change in privacy setting, type of post, tagged friend
<b>Post content</b>	Word2vec embeddings, Google content-classification categories, sentiment
<b>Friend-specific</b>	Days since first and last communication, #wall words exchanged, #likes from friend to user

# Prediction algorithms

Supervised learning algorithms with cross validation


**Random Forests, XGBoost**, Decision Trees, Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machines, Deep Neural Networks

Baselines


Random: Randomly predicts “stop sharing” for a pair

Interaction: Low interaction level → “stop sharing”

Are our models better than the baselines?




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
The fraction of posts the user actually wanted to stop sharing that were predicted




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
# Are our models better than the baselines?




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
# Are our models better than the baselines?



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**Substantial improvement over baselines**

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
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
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# Recommendation accuracy of our models







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# Recommendation accuracy of our models



# Recommendation accuracy of our models



**30 recommendations with good precision!**

# Understanding inaccurate predictions

Qualitative data from survey: “Why” did desired setting change?

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*“Because the people I feel close to has changed in the years since that post.”*

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# Understanding inaccurate predictions

Qualitative data from survey: “Why” did desired setting change?

*“I no longer participate in these activities and don't find them appropriate any longer.”*

*“Because the people I feel close to has changed in the years since that post.”*

*“ it shows a time that I was upset and i would rather not relive that.”*

Coded this data to identify additional predictive features for future efforts



# Future features to collect

Features of posts

Features from external content (image/video)

Classes of sensitive information (e.g., children)

Similarity of content with user's current interest

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Features of posts

Features from external content (image/video)

Classes of sensitive information (e.g., children)

Similarity of content with user's current interest

Features of friends

Interests, likes and dislikes of specific friends

If particular friends are close family or related

Frequency of offline interaction

# Users change privacy preferences over time

2009



**Content posted in freshman year:**  
shared with everybody on internet

2012



**3 years later:** Hiring manager and colleagues **should not** see this

**Temporal privacy management:** control **who can see old content (e.g., via deletion)**

**Temporal Privacy: Deleting content**

# Collecting data on privacy preference change

In this study we focus on Twitter




Simple privacy preferences

Either publicly visible to everyone

Or withdrawn from public domain (by deletion or making account private)

30/10/2015

(date of experiment)




**Time in past when the tweets were posted (relative to the date of experiment)**

All of these past tweets were **public when they were posted**

If **inaccessible** on experiment date, privacy preferences **changed** over time

# Do users change privacy preferences over time?



**Users change privacy for increasing amount of old data with time**


How do these users change privacy of this content?

# Mechanisms to change privacy on Twitter

Three ways users change privacy of old content in Twitter  
They are the temporal privacy control mechanisms

Mechanism	Description
<b>Selective deletion</b>	Selectively withdraw some old tweets to control exposure
<b>Account deletion</b>	Withdraw all old tweets to control exposure in bulk
<b>Making account private</b>	Withdraw all old tweets to control exposure in bulk

# How do users change privacy preferences?



Changing privacy for content from **far past compared to recent past**

**Very different mechanisms**



# Do many users change privacy of old content?

We randomly sample **100k** active users from 2009

Out of 8.9m random old tweets from these users 29.1% is inaccessible

What fraction of users change privacy of their content?

User type	% of all users
Selectively deleted tweets	8.3%
Deleted their account	15.9%
Made their account private	10.4%
<b>Users who take actions that changes privacy of their content</b>	<b>34.6%</b>


**A significant fraction of users change privacy of their old content**

# However there is a problem ...

## Issue with content withdrawal

Posts from others (e.g. replies, tags) **leak information about withdrawn content**

We call them residual activities



Created an app to raise awareness

<http://twitter-app.mpi>

on leak

# Need for temporal privacy: Summary

Twitter users indeed withdraw 28% of their 6 year old posts

Residual activities leak a lot of information about withdrawn content

Created a web application to raise user awareness about the information leak

# Deletion Privacy

Courtaey for some slides: Mohsen Minaei


# Enormous amount of social content is deleted

Long-term exposure of the shared data raises numerous longitudinal privacy concerns



Deletions are common on social platforms

> 30% of posts are deleted within a 6 year period



**Do deletions hide the unwanted information?**

# Case 2: Fallait Pas Supprimer

“Should not Delete”



**Fallait Pas Supprimer** 📸

@FallaitPasSuppr

Recueil de tweets supprimés & contenus gênants ● Attention: selon @GeWoessner d'@Europe1, dans le passé mon compte "se serait hystérisé sur les #juifs"

## Case 2: Fallait Pas Supprimer

**Deletion of normal daily users are noticed**

Fallait Pas Supprimer 

@FallaitPasSuppr

Recueil de tweets supprimés & contenus gênants ● Attention: selon @GeWoessner d'@Europe1, dans le passé mon compte "se serait hystérisé sur les #juifs"

92 Following 919 Followers

# Web Services Hoard Deleted Content

Removeddit



Uneddit



StackPrinter-Deleted

YouTomb



Politwoops





# Lethe: Intuition

A simple but drastic solution:


**Hide and resurrect the non-deleted posts!!**

Confuse the adversary: is a post hidden or deleted?

A trade-off between Privacy and Availability



# Twitter example



**@JimGaffigan**

Oct 16 2011 ← Reply ★ Favorite ↻ Retweet

Autocorrect is like that person who just graduated college and think they know everything.



**@juliussharpe**

Mar 9 2013 ← Reply ★ Favorite ↻ Retweet

Life is basically all the stuff you have to do to get from coffee time to whiskey time.



**@jasonroeder**


Jul 2 2014 ← Reply ★ Favorite ↻ Retweet

For me, the hardest part of the driving test was escaping before the car filled with ocean water.



# Key idea of the design

Intermittent withdrawal mechanism



Example of a non-deleted post for a day with 90% availability

# Threat Model

Persistently observes the platform and takes snapshot of it at different times

Act as normal users

Large-scale analysis of data

# System & Security Goals

Deletion Privacy

Adversarial overhead

Availability

# Deletion privacy: Our definition


Uncertainty about a post being deleted or just temporarily withdrawn at a given point of time

$$LR = \frac{\Pr(\text{observation of all periods} \mid \text{post deleted at time } t_c)}{\Pr(\text{observation of all periods} \mid \text{post not deleted at time } t_c)}$$

Observed  
states

$$LR = \frac{\Pr(\mathcal{O}(\Delta t_u, \Delta t_d) \mid \mathcal{R}(t_c) = 0)}{\Pr(\mathcal{O}(\Delta t_u, \Delta t_d) \mid \mathcal{R}(t_c) = 1)}$$

Real State  
of the post



# Likelihood ratio (LR)

Analyzing the LR

$$LR = \left( \frac{\overline{F_{T_u}}(\Delta t_u)}{f_{T_u}(\Delta t_u)} + 1 \right) \cdot \frac{1}{\overline{F_{T_d}}(\Delta t_d - 1)}$$

LR is dependent on the PMF and CCDF of the up distribution as well as the CCDF of the down distribution

# Quantifying the success of adversary

**Adversarial overhead:** precision and recall

$$\textit{Precision} = \frac{TP}{TP+FP}$$

$$\textit{Recall} = \frac{TP}{TP+FN}$$

TP: correctly detected deleted posts	FP: falsely detected non-deleted posts
FN: falsely not detected deleted posts	TN: correctly not detected non-deleted posts

**Platform Availability:** avg. availability of a post within a period



# Choice of the up/down distributions

$$LR = \left( \frac{\overline{F}_{T_u}(\Delta t_u)}{f_{T_u}(\Delta t_u)} + 1 \right) \cdot \frac{1}{\overline{F}_{T_d}(\Delta t_d - 1)}$$

Up Distribution: memoryless Geometric distribution

It has a constant inverse hazard rate for all up time periods


Down Distribution: heavy tailed Negative binomial distribution

lowest inverse CCDF value via empirical exploration

Deletion Privacy = Adversary Decision Threshold

$$LR = \left( \frac{\overline{F_{T_u}}(\Delta t_u)}{f_{T_u}(\Delta t_u)} + 1 \right) \cdot \frac{1}{\overline{F_{T_d}}(\Delta t_d - 1)}$$

*C*



# System Evaluation

What is the adversarial overhead for identifying deleted posts with Lethe?

# Experiment set up

## Dataset:

1% random sample of daily tweets (Oct 15 – Mar 17)

100 million tweets deleted from the one billion collection




## Parameters

Mean down time: 1 hour

Mean up time: 6, 9, 19, hours

availability 85, 90, 95%

# Adversarial overhead with increasing precision



Adversary has a low precision in identifying deleted content for different thresholds for all values of platform availability