## **Cryptographically Robust Large Boolean Functions**

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2/6/2010

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
#### Outline of the Talk

- Importance of Boolean functions in Cryptography
- Important Cryptographic properties
- Proposed Construction:
  - Mathematical Formulation
  - Cryptographic Strength
- VLSI Architecture:
  - Scalability
  - Comparisons

#### **Block Ciphers**

They are common encryption modules which operate on blocks of data:


Ex: AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) operates on 128 bit of data.




Algorithm is known to the adversary; the key is the only secret



Typically the block size is 1 or a few bits.





#### DES S-box

# 8 "substitution boxes" or S-boxes Each S-box maps 6 bits to 4 bits S-box number 1

#### input bits (0,5)

#### input bits (1,2,3,4)


| 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111

- 00 | 1110 0100 1101 0001 0010 1111 1011 1000 0011 1010 0110 1100 0101 1001 0000 0111
- 01 | 0000 1111 0111 0100 1110 0010 1101 0001 1010 0110 1100 1011 1001 0101 0011 1000
- 10 | 0100 0001 1110 1000 1101 0110 0010 1011 1111 1100 1001 0111 0011 1010 0101 0000
- 11 | 1111 1100 1000 0010 0100 1001 0001 0111 0101 1011 0011 1110 1010 0000 0110

What is the design principle?

#### **AES Substitution**

#### Assume 192 bit block, 4x6 bytes



- ByteSub is AES's "S-box"
- Can be viewed as nonlinear (but invertible) composition of some math operations.
- What is the logic behind the construction? What is it based on?

#### Design Issues and Modern Challenges

- We require large boolean functions : Typically operating on say 32 bits.
- Area required to implement
  - A Boolean function with n inputs –

<u>Exponential in n</u>

More complex if we require to generate more than one output simultaneously

#### **Boolean Functions**

- Block and stream ciphers can be visualized as Boolean functions.
- A Boolean function is a mapping from  $\{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}$
- A Boolean function on n-inputs can be represented in minimal sum (XOR +) of products (AND .) form:

$$f(\mathbf{x}_{1},...,\mathbf{x}_{n}) = a_{0} + a_{1} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{1} + ... + a_{n} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{n} + a_{1,2} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{1} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{2} + ... + a_{n-1,n} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{n-1} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{n} + ... + a_{1,2,..,n} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{1} \cdot \mathbf{x}_{2} \cdot ... \mathbf{x}_{n}$$

- This is called the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF)
- If the <u>and</u> terms have all zero coefficients we have an affine function
- If the constant term is further 0, we have a <u>linear</u> function

#### **Boolean Function**

A Boolean function is a mapping from {0,1}<sup>m</sup>→{0,1}

 $f: \Sigma^n \to \{0,1\}$  be a Boolean Function. Binary sequence  $(f(\alpha_0), f(\alpha_1), ..., f(\alpha_{2^n-1}))$ is called the Truth Table of f

Sequence of a Boolean Function:

 $\{(-1)^{f(\alpha_0)}, (-1)^{f(\alpha_1)}, \dots, (-1)^{f(\alpha_{2^{n-1}})}\}$  is called sequence of f

#### **Balanced Function**

- A Boolean function is said to be <u>balanced</u> if its truth table has equal number of ones and zeros.
- Thus in the sequence of a balanced Boolean function the number of 1s and -1s are the same.

#### Scalar Product of Sequences

Consider f and g as two Boolean functions.

Consider,  $\eta$  be the sequence of f and  $\varepsilon$  be the sequence of g.

Define,

 $<\eta, \varepsilon >=$  (#no of cases when f=g)-(#no of cases when f  $\neq$  g)

#### Non-linearity

The non-linearity of a Boolean function can be defined as the distance between the function and the set of all affine functions.

$$\therefore N_f = \min_{g \in A_n} d(f, g)$$

where  $A_n$  is the set of all affine functions over  $\Sigma^n$ 

$$\begin{split} d(f,g) &= 2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} < \eta, \varepsilon > \\ \therefore N_f &= 2^{n-1} - \frac{1}{2} \max_{i=0,1,\dots,2^{n-1}} \{ |\eta, l_i| \}, \end{split}$$
where  $l_i$  is the sequence of a linear function in  $z$ 

## A Compact Representation of all the linear functions

- Hadamard Matrix: Any rxr matrix with elements in  $\{-1,1\}$  if HH<sup>T</sup>=rI<sub>r</sub>, where I<sub>r</sub> is the identity matrix of dimension rxr.
- Walsh Hadamard Matrix:

$$H_0 = 1, \ H_1 = \begin{bmatrix} H_{n-1} & H_{n-1} \\ H_{n-1} & -H_{n-1} \end{bmatrix}, n = 1, 2, \dots$$

- Each row of H<sub>n</sub> is the sequence of a linear function in x belonging to {0,1}<sup>n</sup>
- Each row,  $I_i$  is the sequence of the Boolean function,

 $g(x) = \langle \alpha_i, x \rangle, \alpha_i$  is the binary representation of *i* Note that  $\alpha_i$  and *x* are not sequences, but they are binary tuples of length *n* 

#### Balancedness

- The truth-table of the Boolean function has an equal number of 0's and 1's.
- XOR is a balanced function.
- AND is an unbalanced function.
- So, we prefer XOR...

#### Non-linearity

- What is a linear function?
- f is said to be linear wrt + if
  - f(x+y)=f(x)+f(y)

$$x = (x_1, x_2), y = (y_1, y_2), x \oplus y = ((x_1 \oplus x_2), (y_1 \oplus y_2))$$
  
Define,  $f(x) = x_1 \oplus x_2$ .  
 $\therefore f(x \oplus y) = f(x_1 \oplus x_2, y_1 \oplus y_2)$   
 $= x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus y_1 \oplus y_2$   
 $= f(x) \oplus f(y)$ 


So, XOR is a linear function. But we want non-linear functions. So, we don't want XOR!

#### Computing Non-linearity.

 <b>x1</b>	<b>x2</b>	x1x2	0	<b>x1</b>	x2	x1^x2
0	0	0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	0	1	1
1	0	0	0	1	0	1
1	1	1	0	1	1	0

Non-linearity is the minimum distance from the truth tables of the linear equations. Here it is 1. So, non-linearity of AND is 1.

#### A Schematic Diagram



#### Construction of *n*×*k* Mapping

The n-bit input is split into two portions:

- x of size k bits
- y of size n-k bits

Input, z = (y, x)

2<sup>(n-k)</sup> kxk Linear Transformations

- Each transformation operates on x
- Converts the k-bit input to a k-bit output
- The multiplexer chooses one of the k bits depending on y

Output,  $Q(z) = \{q_1(z), \dots, q_k(z)\}$ 

#### Properties of the set S

- Formed of linear transformation of order k and elements in GF(2) i,e {0, 1}
- The transformations represented in the form of matrices, T<sub>k</sub> have maximal period:

 $\forall v \in GF(2^k) \setminus \{0\} \text{ and } 1 \le i < j \le 2^k - 1,$  $T_k^i(v) \ne T_k^j(v) \Longrightarrow T_k^{2^k - 1} = I, \text{ where I is a } k \times k$ identity matrix.

#### Properties of the set S

 $S = \{I, T_k, ..., T_k^{2^k - 2}\}$  contains a set of  $2^k - 1$  invertible matrices of dimension  $k \times k$ 

From this set we choose  $2^{n-k}$  linear transformations for the linear array of transformations.

$$2^{k} - 1 > 2^{(n-k)}$$
  

$$\leftrightarrow 2^{k} > 2^{(n-k)}$$
  

$$\leftrightarrow k > n-k$$
  

$$\leftrightarrow k > n/2$$

#### Properties of the set S

Lemma 1: The transformation  $T_k^{i-1} \in S$  is invertible  $(1 \le i < 2^k)$ .

Lemma 2: Set S is closed under addition modulo 2.

Lemma 3: If  $T_k^{i-1}, T_k^{j-1} \in S$ , rows of the matrices  $T_k^{i-1}$  and  $T_k^{j-1}$  are pairwise distinct when  $i \neq j$ .

#### Mathematical Formulation

Linear transformations can be represented as k x k matrices:

$$Li = \begin{pmatrix} li1\\ \dots\\ lik \end{pmatrix}, 0 \le i \le 2^{n-k} - 1$$

Mathematically, the output k-bit vector Q(z) is

$$Q(z) = \bigoplus_{\sigma=0}^{2^{n-k}-1} D_{\sigma}(y) L_{\sigma}(x)$$
$$D_{\sigma}(y) = (\overline{i_1} \oplus y_1) (\overline{i_2} \oplus y_2) \dots (\overline{i_{n-k}} \oplus y_{n-k}),$$
$$\sigma = (i_1 i_2 \dots i_{n-k}), y = (y_1 y_2 \dots y_{n-k})$$

#### **Cryptographic Properties**

Theorem 4: : The non-linearity of each component function  $q_i(z)$   $(1 \le i \le k)$  is at least  $2^{n-1} - 2^{k-1}$ , where k > n/2. Theorem 5: : Any component function  $q_i(z)$   $(1 \le i \le k)$  is balanced. Theorem 6: : The non-linearity of any non-zero linear combination of the component functions  $q_i(z)$   $(1 \le i \le k)$  is at least  $2^{n-1} - 2^{k-1}$  (k > n/2). The resulting

functions are always balanced.

#### Resiliency

Definition 6: Resiliency: The Boolean function  $f(x_1,\ldots,x_n)$  of an *n*-variable is called correlationimmune of order m  $(1 \leq m \leq n-1)$  iff, for any  $1 < i_1 < \ldots \leq i_m \leq n$  and  $a_1, \ldots, a_m$ ,  $P(f(X_1, \ldots, X_n) = 1 | X_{i_1} = a_1, \ldots, X_{i_m} = a_m)) =$  $P(f(X_1,...,X_n) = 1)$  where the  $X_i$ s are independent and uniformly distributed binary random variables and  $P(X_i = 0) = P(X_i = 1) = \frac{1}{2}, a_i = 0 \text{ or } 1; P(.)$ and P(.|.) mean the probability and the conditional probability respectively [32]. Balanced  $m^{th}$  order correlation immune functions are called m-resilient functions [31]

#### **Cryptographic Properties**

Theorem 8: : The mapping  $Q(z) = \{q_1(z), \ldots, q_k(z)\}$  is a regular mapping from  $V_n$  to  $V_k$ .

Theorem 9: : The algebraic degree of each component functions of the  $n \times k$  mapping (k > n/2) and their non-zero linear combinations is (n - k + 1).

Theorem 10: : The maximum resiliency of the component functions of the  $n \times k$  mapping (k > n/2) and their non-zero linear combinations is k - 2.

### **Cryptographic Properties**

- For each component function  $q_i(z)$ 
  - Non linearity is at least 2<sup>n-1</sup> 2<sup>k-1</sup>, k>n/2
  - It is balanced
    - Same is true for any non-zero linear combinations
  - Algebraic degree is at least (n-k+1)
  - Mapping  $Q(z) = \{ q_1(z), \dots, q_k(z) \}$  is regular from Vn to Vk

Number of mappings generated is  $P_{2^{n-k}}^{2^k-1}$ 



#### Strict Avalanche Criterion

- Boolean function f on Vn satisfies SAC iff f(x)⊕ f(x ⊕ α) is balanced for all α ∈ Vn
- Original construction Q(z) does not satisfy SAC
- For z' = Wz,
  - Q(Wz) satisfies SAC
  - W is a non-degenerate n x n matrix with entries from GF(2)


$$W = \begin{pmatrix} I_{n-k} & 0 \\ D_{kXn-k} & I_k \end{pmatrix}; D = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

#### Example : 8x5 mapping

■ n=8, k>4=5

Τ=	1	1	0	0	0
	1	1	1	0	0
	0	1	0	1	0
	0	0	1	0	1
	0	0	0	1	1

#### Compute Q(156), assume key=0



#### **Cryptographic Properties**

- Non-linearity is 112 which is very high (maximum for 8 variables 120)
- Degree of each function is 4
- All non-zero combinations are balanced and have non-linearity of 112.
- Robustness against Differential Cryptanalysis is 0.848, bias in the Linear Approximation Table is 16.
- Each boolean function satisfies SAC

#### VLSI Design of the Architecture

Input y denotes the CA to be selected

- NB: All the CA are the same machine in different states of evolution (the clock cycles are different)
- y determines the number of cycles, s, the CA is to be applied
- A mapping, g, from y to s is required=> Q(z)=T<sup>g(y)</sup>(x)
  - (Alternate expression of the construction)

Domain of g is  $V_{n-k}$ , while range is  $V_k$ 

One to many mapping (as, k>n/2)


No deterministic hardware possible

#### **Restricted Design Architecture**

- Restrict the clock cycles to 2<sup>(n-k)</sup>
- Mapping becomes (n-k) to (n-k)
- Permutation is done by using XORing with a secret k, s
- Value of s for a given y, will depend on the secret key, key of n-k bits
- Number of possible permutations 2<sup>n-k</sup>
- Cryptographic properties remain the same, as this is an equivalent representation.

#### Restricted Design Architecture

- Each CA is to be cycled s times i.e. T needs to be multiplied s times
- Square and multiply algorithm is used for better performance
- Output is obtained in O(n-k) time



#### **Experimental Results**

Dimension	XOR	MUX	Flip-Flop	Time (clk cycles)
8 x 5	26	15	3	3
10 x 6	54	24	4	4
16 x 9	208	63	7	7
24 x 13	691	141	11	11

Observation: Growth of the resources is polynomial with dimension

#### Scalability

 $\mu_1 = Hardware/bits$ 

$$u_2 = (Hardware \times delay)/bits$$

		The g	rowth of	parameters $\mu_1$ and $\mu_2$ with $n$ and $k$
n	k	$\mu_1$	$\mu_2$	
8	5	11.2	33.6	
10	6	25.5	68	
16	9	37	260	n: No of Input bits
20	11	54	488	k: No of Output bits
22	12	54	542	$\mu_1$ : Hardware/bits
26	14	86	1030	$\mu_2$ : (Hardware $\times$ delay)/bit
30	16	111.5	1561	
38	20	175.5	3159	
50	26	304	7294	
56	29	378	10206	

### Comparisons

Comparison of a 24 variable Boolean function with that of [3]					
Parameter	Method in [3] (Pipelined)	Proposed Method (Pipelined)			
Number of Boolean Functions	1	13			
Non-linearity	$2^{23}$	$2^{23}$			
Degree	5	12			
Resiliency	18	11			
Flip Flops	2196	143			
Gates	129	830			
Delay (clock cycles)	14	11			
$\mu_1$	2325	75			
$\mu_2$	32550	823			

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## Small and compact designs survive...



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