Formal Representation Language for PUF Constructions and Compositions and Learnability Analysis

Durba Chatterjee, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, and Aritra Hazra

Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, India durba@iitkgp.ac.in, debdeep@iitkgp.ac.in, aritrah@cse.iitkgp.ac.in

We present a syntactical representation (grammar) to formally describe any PUF construction. We then use this grammar to represent several PUF designs.

1 Grammar for Formal PUF Representation

The grammar to represent any PUF design or composition of PUFs is given as follows:

```
TOP::
    MODULE TOP
  | MODULE
MODULE::
    begin PRIMITIVE ( INPUT_DEF )
        STATEMENTS
        OUTPUT DEF
    end PRIMITIVE
PRIMITIVE::
    PUF_PRIMITIVE
  | BASIC_PRIMITIVE
PUF_PRIMITIVE::
    APUF
  | XORAPUF
BASIC_PRIMITIVE::
    D_FLIPFLOP
  | ARBITER
  | MUX_2x1
  | SWITCH_2x2
  | DELAY-CHAIN
  | NAND_LATCH
INPUT_DEF::
    DATA_TYPE TUPLE DELIMITER INPUT_DEF
  | DATA_TYPE TUPLE
  | //no-input
OUTPUT_DEF::
    return ( INPUT_DEF ) DELIMITER | //no-output
```

```
PRIMITIVE_CALL::
    PRIMITIVE ( VARIABLES )
TUPLE::
   < VARIABLES >
 | STRING
 | NUMBER
VARIABLES::
    TUPLE DELIMITER VARIABLES
  | TUPLE
  | //null
STRING::
    [a-zA-Z_][a-zA-ZO-9_]*
NUMBER::
    [1-9][0-9]*
DELIMITER::
   ; | , //semi-colon or comma
STATEMENTS::
    STATEMENT STATEMENTS
 | STATEMENT
STATEMENT::
  ASSIGNMENT
 | IFELSE_STATEMENT
 | SERIAL_STATEMENT
  | PARALLEL_STATEMENT
ASSIGNMENT::
    STRING = EXPRESSION DELIMITER
  | TUPLE = PRIMITIVE_CALL DELIMITER
  | DELIMITER //null-statement
EXPRESSION::
    EXPRESSION ARITHMETIC_OPERATOR EXPRESSION
  | EXPRESSION LOGICAL_OPERATOR EXPRESSION
  | ( EXPRESSION )
  | not EXPRESSION
 | STRING
  | NUMBER
ARITHMETIC_OPERATOR::
    / | * | + | - | %
LOGICAL_OPERATOR::
    and \mid or \mid xor \mid == \mid != \mid <= \mid >= \mid < \mid >
IFELSE_STATEMENT::
    if EXPRESSION then
```

STATEMENTS end if | if EXPRESSION then STATEMENTS end if else STATEMENTS end if | if EXPRESSION then STATEMENTS end if ELSEIF_STATEMENTS else STATEMENTS end if ELSEIF_STATEMENTS:: else if EXPRESSION then STATEMENTS end if ELSEIF_STATEMENTS | else if EXPRESSION then STATEMENTS end if SERIAL_STATEMENT:: serial ASSIGNMENT to EXPRESSION do STATEMENTS end serial PARALLEL_STATEMENT:: parallel ASSIGNMENT to EXPRESSION do STATEMENTS end parallel

2 Structural Design of PUF Constructions

In this section, we present the structural design of PUFs using the grammar given in Section 1. We begin by enlisting the primitive components required in each construction and then represent it using the formal representation language generated by the grammar.

2.1 APUF [1]

Primitive components:

- 1. D Flip-flop (D_FLIPFLOP) and Arbiter (ARBITER)
- 2. 2×1 -Multiplexer (MUX_2x1) and 2×2 -Switch (SWITCH_2x2)
- 3. Delay chain of Arbiter PUF (DELAY-CHAIN)

Algorithm 1: Structural Representation of APUF

Input parameters:						
– Number of stages/switches (n)						
– Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_n \rangle)$						
- Enable bit (en)						
Output parameters:						
$- \text{Response bit } (\texttt{apuf_out})$						
Internal variables:						
– Top signal lines at the input of each stage (t)						
– Bottom signal lines at the input of each stage	(b)					
Structural Design:						
begin APUF (num n, vec c,						
bit en)	begin SWITCH_2x2 (bit t_in,					
$\langle \mathtt{t}, \mathtt{b} angle = \mathtt{DELAY-CHAIN} \ (\mathtt{n}, \mathtt{e}\mathtt{n}, \mathtt{c});$	bit b_in, bit c_in)					
$\texttt{apuf}_\texttt{out} = \texttt{ARBITER} \ (\texttt{t},\texttt{b});$	$\texttt{top_out} = \texttt{MUX_2x1} \ (\texttt{t_in},\texttt{b_in},\texttt{c_in});$					
return (bit apuf_out);	$bot_out = MUX_2x1 (b_in, t_in, c_in);$					
end APUF	$\mathbf{return} \;(\; \mathbf{vec} \; \langle \texttt{top_out}, \texttt{bot_out} \rangle \;);$					
	end SWITCH_2x2					
begin DELAY-CHAIN (num n,						
${f vec}$ c, ${f bit}$ en)	begin ARBITER (bit in, bit clk)					
t = en; b = en;	$\mathtt{out} = \mathtt{D_FLIPFLOP} \ (\mathtt{in}, \mathtt{clk});$					
serial $i = 1$ to $n - 1$ do	return (bit out);					
$\langle t, b \rangle = SWITCH_2x2 (t, b, c_i);$	end ARBITER					
end serial						
return (vec $\langle t, b \rangle$);						
end DELAY-CHAIN						





2.2 XOR-APUF [2]

Primitive components:

- 1. Arbiter PUF (APUF)
- 2. XOR gate (\oplus)

Representation:

Input parameters: - Number of stages/switches (n)

- Number of delay chains (k)
- Challenge bits $(c=\langle c_1,\ldots,c_n\rangle)$

– Enable bit (en)

 $Output \ parameters:$

- Response bit (xorpuf_out)

Internal variables:

```
- Response from each APUF (a)
```

```
\begin{array}{l} \underline{Structural\ Design:}\\ \hline \mathbf{begin\ XORPUF\ (\ num\ n,\ num\ k,\ vec\ c,\ bit\ en\ )}\\ parallel\ i=1\ to\ k\ do\\ |\ \mathbf{a_i}=APUF\ (n,\,c,\,en);\\ end\ parallel\\ xorpuf\_out\ = \mathbf{a_1}\oplus\cdots\oplus\mathbf{a_k};\\ return\ (\ bit\ xorpuf\_out\ );\\ end\ XORPUF\end{array}
```



Figure 2: 3-XOR APUF

2.3 FF-APUF [3]

Primitive components:

- 1. Arbiter with D flip-flop (ARBITER)
- 2. 2×2 -switch (SWITCH_2x2)



Figure 3: Feed-forward arbiter PUFs [3]

Algorithm 3: Structural Representation of FF-APUF with Single FF Input and Single FF Output

Input parameters: - Number of stages/switches (n) – Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \ldots, c_n \rangle)$ - Enable bit (en) - Feed-forward input stage to arbiter (ff_in) - Feed forward output stage from arbiter (ff_out) Output parameters: - Response bit (ffapuf_out) Internal variables: - Top signal lines at the input of each stage (t) - Bottom signal lines at the input of each stage (b) - Response from feed-forward arbiter (arb_int) Structural Design: begin FFAPUF (num n, vec c, bit en, num ff_in, num ff_out) $\langle t, b \rangle = FF-DELAY-CHAIN (n, c, en, ff_in, ff_out);$ $ffapuf_out = ARBITER(t, b);$ return (bit ffapuf_out); end FFAPUF begin FF-DELAY-CHAIN (num n, vec c, bit en, num ff_in, num ff_out) t = en; b = en;serial i = 1 to n - 1 do $\langle t, b \rangle = SWITCH_2x2 (t, b, c_i);$ if $i == ff_i$ then $| arb_int = ARBITER (t, b);$ end if if $i + 1 == \texttt{ff_out then}$ $| c_{i+1} = arb_int;$ end if end serial $\langle t, b \rangle = SWITCH_2x2 (t, b, c_n);$ return (vec $\langle t, b \rangle$); \mathbf{end} FF-DELAY-CHAIN



Figure 4: Feed-forward arbiter PUFs with two feed-forward outputs [3]

Other Variants of Feed Forward APUF

1. FF-APUF with single feed-forward input and multiple feed-forward outputs

```
Algorithm 4: Structural Representation of FF-APUF with Single FF Input and Multiple FF
Output
 Input parameters:
      - Number of stages/switches (n)
      - Challenge bits (c = \langle c_1, \ldots, c_n \rangle)
      - Enable bit (en)
      - Feed-forward input stage to arbiter (ff_in)
      - Feed forward output stages from arbiter (\texttt{ff_out} = \langle q_1, \dots, q_m \rangle)
 Output parameters:
      - Response bit (ffapuf_out)
 Internal variables:
      - Top signal lines at the input of each stage (t)
      - Bottom signal lines at the input of each stage (b)
      - Response from feed-forward arbiter (arb_int)
 Structural Design:
 begin FFAPUF_SIMO ( num n, vec c, bit en,
                              num ff_in, vec ff_out )
 t = en; b = en;
 serial i = 1 to n - 1 do
     \langle t, b \rangle = SWITCH_2x2 (t, b, c_i);
     if i == ff_i then
     | arb_int = ARBITER (t, b);
     end if
     if i+1 == q_1 or \cdots or i+1 == q_m then
     | c_{i+1} = arb_int;
     end if
 end serial
 \langle t, b \rangle = SWITCH_2x2 (t, b, c_n);
 ffapuf_out = ARBITER (t, b);
 return ( bit ffapuf_out );
 end FFAPUF_SIMO
```

2. FF-APUF with multiple feed-forward inputs and multiple feed-forward outputs Depending on the relative position of the input and output stages of the feed forward loops, the FF-APUFs architectures can be categorized as – (a) Nested, (b) Overlap, (c) Cascade, and (d) Separate. Figure 5 depicts all the four configurations assuming only two feed forward loops.

Algorithm 5:	Structural	Representation	of FF-	APUF	with	Multiple	\mathbf{FF}	Input	and	Multiple	\mathbf{FF}
Output											

Input parameters:
– Number of stages/switches (n)
- Challenge bits $(\mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{c}_1, \dots, \mathbf{c}_n))$
– Enable bit (en)
- Feed-forward input stages to arbitres $(ff_i = \langle p_1, \dots, p_m \rangle)$
- Feed forward output stages from arbitres $(\mathbf{ff}_{out} = \langle \mathbf{q}_1, \dots, \mathbf{q}_m \rangle)$
Output parameters:
- Response bit (ffapuf_out)
Internal variables:
- Top signal lines at the input of each stage (t)
- Bottom signal lines at the input of each stage (b)
- Response from feed-forward arbiter (arb_int)
Structural Design:
begin FFAPUF_MIMO (num n, vec c, bit en,
vec ff_in, vec ff_out)
t = en; b = en;
serial $i = 1$ to $n - 1$ do
$ \langle t, b \rangle = \text{SWITCH}_2x2 (t, b, c_i);$
serial $k = 1$ to m do
$ $ if $i == p_k$ then
$ $ arb_int _k = ARBITER (t, b);
end if
end serial
serial $k = 1$ to m do
$ $ if $i+1 == q_k$ then
$ c_{i+1} = arb_int_k;$
end if
end serial
end serial
$\langle t, b \rangle = \text{SWITCH}_2 x 2 \ (t, b, c_n);$
$ffapuf_out = ARBITER (t, b);$
return (bit ffapuf_out);
end FFAPUF_MIMO



(a) Nested configuration.



(b) Overlap configuration.



(c) Cascade configuration.



Figure 5: Different variants of FF-APUF with multiple feed-forward input and multiple feed-forward output

2.4 FF-XOR-PUF [4]

Primitive components:

- 1. FF-APUF (FFAPUF)
- 2. XOR gate (\oplus)

Algorithm 6: Structural Representation of FF-XORPUF
Input parameters:
– Number of stages/switches (n)
– Number of delay chains (k)
– Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_n \rangle)$
- Enable bit (en)
- Feed-forward input stages to arbitres $(\mathtt{ff_in} = \langle \mathtt{p}_1, \dots, \mathtt{p}_k \rangle)$
– Feed forward output stages from arbitres $(\texttt{ff_out} = \langle q_1, \dots, q_k \rangle)$
Output parameters:
$- \text{Response bit } (\texttt{ffxorpuf_out})$
Internal variables:
– Response from each FF-APUF (ffa)
Structural Design:
begin FFXURPUF (num n, vec c, num k, bit en,
num ff_in, num ff_out)
parallel $i = 1$ to k do
$ ffa_i = FFAPUF (n, c, en, p_i, q_i);$
end parallel
$\texttt{ffxorpuf_out} = \texttt{ffa}_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus \texttt{ffa}_k;$
return (bit ffxorpuf_out);
end FFXORPUF



Figure 6: Feed-forward XOR APUFs [4]



Figure 7: 5-4 DAPUF

2.5 DAPUF [5]

Primitive components:

- 1. Delay chain of Arbiter PUF (DELAY-CHAIN)
- 2. Arbiter with D flip-flop (ARBITER)
- 3. XOR gate (\oplus)

Figure 7 depicts a specific DAPUF construction consisting of five delay chains, which takes an n-bit challenge and gives a 4-bit response.

Algorithm 7: Structural Representation of DAPUF

Input parameters:

- Number of delay chains (k)
- Number of stages/switches in each delay-chain (n)
- Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \ldots, c_n \rangle)$
- Enable bit (en)

Output parameters:

- m Response bits (dapuf_out = $\langle r_1, \ldots, r_m \rangle$)

Internal variables:

- Top output signal line of each delay-chain $(t = \langle t_1, \dots, t_k \rangle)$
- Bottom output signal line of each delay-chain $(b=\langle b_1,\ldots,b_k\rangle)$
- Maximum number of XOR inputs from arbitres (xor_cnt)
- Response from arbitres with top signal lines (a_g^{top})
- Response from arbitres with bottom signal lines (a_{σ}^{bot})

Structural Design:

begin DAPUF (num k, num n, vec c, bit en) parallel i = 1 to k do $\langle t_i, b_i \rangle = DELAY-CHAIN (n, en, c);$ end parallel $xor_cnt = MATH-CEIL (k * (k - 1)/m);$ $q = 1; h = 1; r_{h} = 0;$ serial i = 1 to k - 1 do serial j = i + 1 to k do $a^{top} = ARBITER (t_i, t_j);$ $\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{h}} = \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{h}} \oplus \mathbf{a}^{\mathtt{top}};$ g = g + 1;if $g > xor_cnt$ then $h = h + 1; r_h = 0; g = 1;$ end if end serial end serial serial i = 1 to k - 1 do serial j = i + 1 to k do $a^{bot} = ARBITER (b_i, b_j);$ $\mathbf{r}_{h} = \mathbf{r}_{h} \oplus \mathbf{a}^{\texttt{bot}};$ g = g + 1; $\mathbf{if} \ g > \texttt{xor_cnt} \ \mathbf{then}$ $| h = h + 1; r_h = 0; g = 1;$ end if end serial end serial return (vec $\langle r_1, \ldots, r_m \rangle$); end DAPUF



begin DAPUF (num k, num n, vec c, bit en) parallel i = 1 to k do $|\langle t_i, b_i \rangle = DELAY-CHAIN (n, en, c);$ end parallel $xor_cnt = MATH-CEIL (k * (k - 1)/m);$ q = 1;serial i = 1 to k - 1 do parallel j = i + 1 to k do $a_{g}^{top} = ARBITER (t_{i}, t_{j});$ g = g + 1;end parallel end serial serial i = 1 to k - 1 do parallel j = i + 1 to k do $a_{g}^{bot} = ARBITER (b_{i}, b_{j});$ g = g + 1;end parallel end serial $h = 1; r_h = 0;$ parallel g = 1 to k * (k-1)/2 do if $q > (h * xor_cnt)$ then $h = h + 1; \mathbf{r}_{h} = 0;$ end if $\mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{h}} = \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{h}} \oplus \mathbf{a}_{\mathbf{g}}^{\mathtt{top}};$ end parallel parallel g = k * (k-1)/2 to k * (k-1) do if $g > (h * xor_cnt)$ then $| h = h + 1; r_h = 0;$ end if $r_h = r_h \oplus a_g^{bot};$ end parallel return (vec $\langle r_1, \ldots, r_m \rangle$); end DAPUF



Figure 8: Block diagram of a MUX-PUF

2.6 MUX-PUF [6]

Primitive components:

- 1. Arbiter PUF (APUF)
- 2. 2×1 -Multiplexer (MUX_2x1)

Algorithm 8: Structural Representation of MUXPUF

Input parameters:

- Number of delay chains in selection input $(\tt k)$
- Number of stages/switches in each delay-chain $({\tt n})$
- Challenge bits $(\mathtt{c}=\langle\mathtt{c_1},\ldots,\mathtt{c_n}\rangle)$
- Enable bit (**en**)

Output parameters:

-m Response bit (muxpuf_out)

Internal variables:

- Response from each APUF connected to selector input (s_i)
- Response from each APUF connected to data input (d_i)
- Input to MUX $(y_{i,j})$

```
Structural Design:
\overline{\mathrm{begin}\; \mathtt{MUXPUF}} ( \mathrm{num}\; k, \mathrm{num}\; n, vec c, bit en )
muxpuf_out = 0;
parallel i = 1 to k do
| s_i = APUF (n, c, en);
end parallel
parallel i = 1 to 2^k do
    d_i = APUF (n, c, en);
   y_{1,i} = d_i;
end parallel
parallel i = 1 to k do
   serial j = 1 to 2^{k-i} do
    | y_{i+1,j} = MUX_2x1(y_{i,2j-1}, y_{i,2j}, s_i);
   end serial
end parallel
muxpuf_out = y_{k+1,1};
return ( bit muxpuf_out );
\mathbf{end} MUXPUF
```



Figure 9: (k_u, k_l) - Interpose PUF

2.7 Interpose PUF [7]

Algorithm	9:	Structural	R	Representation	of	$(k_u,$	k_d)-Interpose I	PUF

Input parameters:
– Number of stages/switches (n)
– Number of delay chains in lower XOR $PUF(k_1)$
– Number of delay chains in upper XOR $PUF(k_u)$
- Challenge bits $(\mathbf{c} = \langle \mathbf{c}_1, \dots, \mathbf{c}_n \rangle)$
- Interpose bit position (t)
– Enable bit (en)
Output parameters:
- Response bit (ipuf_out)
Internal variables:
- Response from upper XORPUF (\mathbf{v}_n)
- Input challenge set to lower XORPUF ($\mathbf{x} = \langle \mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{r}_{n+1} \rangle$)
Structural Design:
begin IPUF (num n. num k_n , num k_1 , vec c.
num t. bit en)
$\mathbf{v}_{n} = \mathbf{XORPUF} (n, \mathbf{k}_{n}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{en});$
parallel $i = 1$ to $t - 1$ do
$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{y}_{i} = \mathbf{c}_{i}; \end{array}$
end parallel
$\mathbf{x}_{t} = \mathbf{y}_{u};$
parallel $i = t + 1$ to $n + 1$ do
$ x_i = c_{i-1};$
end parallel
$\texttt{ipuf}_{-}\texttt{out} = \texttt{XORPUF} \ (\texttt{n}+\texttt{1},\texttt{k}_\texttt{l},\texttt{x},\texttt{en});$
return (bit ipuf_out);
end IPUF

2.8 ROPUF [2]

Primitive components:

- 1. Ring Oscillators with NOT gate (RING_OSC)
- 2. 2×1 -Multiplexer (MUX_2x1)
- 3. Counter (COUNTER)

F	
Algorithm 10: Structural Representation of ROPUF	
Input parameters:	
– Number of challenge bits (n)	
– Number of inverters in a RO (m)	
- Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \ldots, c_n \rangle)$	
- Enable bit (en)	
Output parameters:	
$-$ Response bit (ropuf_out)	
Internal variables:	
– Signal line at the input of each RO (t)	
- Signal line at the input of upper MUX (y)	
- Signal line at the input of lower MUX (z)	
- Output of first counter (count ₁)	
- Output of second counter (count ₂)	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Structural Design:	
begin ROPUF (num n, num m,	else
vec c, bit en)	$ \text{ ropuf_out} = 0;$
parallel $i = 1$ to 2^n do	end if
$t_i = RING_OSC(m, en);$	<pre>return (bit ropuf_out);</pre>
$y_{1,i} = t_i;$	\mathbf{end} ROPUF
end parallel	
parallel $i = 2^n + 1$ to 2^{n+1} do	begin RING_OSC (num m, bit en)
$t_i = RING_OSC(m, en);$	t = en and t;
$z_{1,i-2^{n}}=t_{i};$	serial $i = 1$ to $m - 1$ do
end parallel	t = not t;
serial $i = 1$ to n do	end serial
parallel $j = 1$ to 2^n do	return (vec t);
$y_{i+1,j} = MUX_2x1 (y_{i,2j-1}, y_{i,2j}, c_i);$	$\mathbf{end}\ \mathtt{RING_OSC}$
$z_{i+1,j} = MUX_2x1 (z_{i,2j-1}, z_{i,2j}, c_i);$	
end parallel	$\mathrm{begin}\ ext{COUNTER}$ ($\mathrm{bit}\ ext{sig_in}$)
end serial	count = 0;
$count_1 = COUNTER(v_{n+1,1});$	${\tt if \ sig_in} == 1 \ {\tt then}$
$count_2 = COUNTER(z_{n+1,1});$	count = count + 1;
if $count_1 > count_2$ then	end if
$ \text{ ropuf_out} = 1;$	return (num count);
end if	end COUNTER



Figure 10: Block diagram of Ring Oscillator PUF [2]



Figure 11: Different configurations of composite PUFs (64-bit challenge and 1-bit response) [8]

2.9 Composite PUF [8]

Here, we consider compositions having at most 2 layers. **Primitive components:**

- 1. Arbiter PUF (APUF)
- 2. Ring Oscillator PUF (ROPUF)
- 3. XOR gate (\oplus)
- 4. Mapping functions

Algorithm 11: Structural Representation of Composite PUF – (A) APUFs + ROPUF

Input parameters:

- Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_n \rangle)$
- Total number of Challenge bits (n)
- Challenge size of APUFs (na)
- Number of inverters in RO (m)
- Enable bit (en)

Output parameters:

- Response bit (cpuf_out)

Internal variables:

- Number of PUFs in lower layer (n_arb)
- Input challenge to lower layer PUF $(\mathbf{x} = \langle \mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{na} \rangle)$
- Input challenge to upper layer PUF $(y = \langle y_1, \dots, y_{n_arb} \rangle)$

 $\begin{array}{l} \underline{Structural\ Design:}\\ \hline \textbf{begin\ CPUF_AR\ (\ num\ n,\ vec\ c,\ num\ na,\ num\ m,\ bit\ en\)}\\ n_arb=n/na;\\ \textbf{parallel}\ i=1\ to\ n_arb\ do\\ &|\ x_i=\langle c_{(i-1)*na+1},\cdots,c_{i*na}\rangle;\\ y_i=APUF\ (na,x_i,en);\\ \textbf{end\ parallel}\\ cpuf_out=ROPUF\ (n_arb,m,y,en);\\ \textbf{return\ (\ bit\ cpuf_out\);}\\ \textbf{end\ CPUF_AR}\end{array}$

Algorithm 12: Structural Representation of Composite PUF – (B) APUFs + XOR

Input parameters:

```
- Challenge bits (c = \langle c_1, \ldots, c_n \rangle)
      - Challenge size of APUFs (na)
      - Enable bit (en)
Output parameters:
      - Response bit (cpuf_out)
Internal variables:
      - Number of PUFs in lower layer (n_arb)
      - Input challenge to lower layer PUF (\mathbf{x} = \langle \mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{na} \rangle)
Structural Design:
begin CPUF_AX ( num n, num na, vec c, bit en )
n_arb = n/na;
parallel i = 1 to n_arb do
     \mathbf{x}_{i} = \langle \mathbf{c}_{(i-1)*na+1}, \cdots, \mathbf{c}_{i*na} \rangle;
    \mathtt{y}_{\mathtt{i}} = \mathtt{APUF} \ (\mathtt{na}, \mathtt{x}_{\mathtt{i}}, \mathtt{en});
end parallel
\mathtt{cpuf\_out} = \mathtt{y}_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus \mathtt{y}_{\mathtt{n\_arb}};
return ( bit cpuf_out );
end CPUF_AX
```

Algorithm 13: Structural Representation of Composite PUF - (C) ROPUFs + APUF

Input parameters: - Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \ldots, c_n \rangle)$ - Challenge size of ROPUFs (nr) - Number of inverters in RO (m) - Enable bit (en) Output parameters: - Response bit (cpuf_out) Internal variables: - Number of PUFs in lower layer (n_ro) - Input challenge to lower layer PUF $(\mathbf{x} = \langle \mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{nr} \rangle)$ - Input challenge to upper layer PUF $(y = \langle y_1, \dots, y_{n-ro} \rangle)$ Structural Design: $\overline{\mathrm{begin}\;\mathrm{CPUF}_{\mathrm{RA}}}$ (num n, num m, num nr, vec c, bit en) $cpuf_out = 0;$ $n_ro = n/nr;$ parallel i = 1 to n_ro do $\mathbf{x}_{i} = \langle \mathbf{c}_{(i-1)*nr+1}, \cdots, \mathbf{c}_{i*nr} \rangle;$ $y_i = ROPUF(nr, m, x_i, en);$ end parallel $cpuf_out = APUF (n_ro, y, en);$ return (bit cpuf_out); $\mathbf{end}~\mathtt{CPUF_RA}$

Algorithm 14: Structural Representation of Composite PUF – (D) ROPUFs + XOR

Input parameters:

- Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_n \rangle)$
- Challenge size of ROPUFs (nr)
- Number of inverters in RO (m)
- Enable bit (en)
- Output parameters:

- Response bit (cpuf_out)

Internal variables:

- Number of PUFs in lower layer (n_ro)
- Input challenge to lower layer PUF $(\mathbf{x} = \langle \mathbf{x}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{x}_{nr} \rangle)$
- Input challenge to upper layer PUF $(y = \langle y_1, \cdots, y_{n_arb} \rangle)$

```
\begin{array}{l} \underline{Structural\ Design:}\\ \hline \textbf{begin\ CPUF_RX\ (num\ n,\ num\ m,\ num\ nr,\ vec\ c,\ bit\ en\)}\\ cpuf_out = 0;\\ n\_ro = n/nr;\\ \textbf{parallel}\ i = 1\ to\ n\_ro\ do\\ &|\quad x_i = \langle c_{(i-1)*nr+1}, \cdots, c_{i*nr} \rangle;\\ y_i = ROPUF(nr, m, x_i, en);\\ \textbf{end\ parallel}\\ cpuf_out = y_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus y_{n\_ro};\\ \textbf{return\ (bit\ cpuf_out\ );}\\ \textbf{end\ CPUF_RX} \end{array}
```

Algorithm 15: Structural Representation of Composite PUF(e)

Input parameters:

- Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_n \rangle)$
- Number of APUFs in lower layer(a)
- Challenge size of ROPUFs (m)
- Number of inverters in RO (inv)
- Enable bit (en)

Output parameters:

- Response bit (cpuf_out)

Internal variables:

- Number of PUFs in lower layer (n_arb)
- Input challenge to lower layer PUF $(\mathbf{x} = \langle \mathbf{x}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{x}_n \mathbf{r} \rangle)$
- Input challenge to upper layer PUF $(\mathtt{y}=\langle \mathtt{y}_1,\cdots, \mathtt{y}_{\mathtt{n}\mathtt{-arb}}\rangle)$

```
Structural Design:
```

```
begin COMPOSEPUF (num n, vec c, bit en, num a, num m, num inv, bit en)
n_a = (n - m)/a - m;
parallel i = 1 to a do
      loc_a = (i-1) * (n_a + m);
      \mathbf{c_a} = \langle \mathbf{c_{loc_a+1}}, \cdots, \mathbf{c_{loc_a+n_a}} \rangle;
      a_i = APUF(n_a, c_a, en);
      loc_r = loc_a + n_a;
     \begin{split} \mathbf{c_r} &= \langle \mathbf{c_{loc_r+1}}, \cdots, \mathbf{c_{loc_r+m}} \rangle; \\ \mathbf{a_i} &= \texttt{ROPUF}(\texttt{m}, \mathbf{c_r}, \texttt{inv}, \texttt{en}); \end{split}
end parallel
parallel i = 1 to a do
x_i = a_i \oplus r_i;
end parallel
\mathtt{c_r} = \langle \mathtt{c_{n-m+1}}, \cdots, \mathtt{c_n} \rangle;
\mathtt{x}_{\mathtt{a}+\mathtt{1}} = \mathtt{ROPUF}(\mathtt{m}, \mathtt{c}_{\mathtt{r}_{\mathtt{a}+\mathtt{1}}}, \mathtt{inv}, \mathtt{en});
cpuf_out = ROPUF(m, x, inv, en);
return cpuf_out;
\mathbf{end}\ \mathtt{COMPOSEPUF}
```

Algorithm 16: Structural Representation of Composite PUF(f)

Input parameters:

- Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \ldots, c_n \rangle)$
- Challenge size of APUFs (na)
- Challenge size of ROPUFs (nr)
- Number of inverters in RO (m)
- Order of APUFs and ROPUFs in first layer

 $(\mathbf{o} = \langle \mathbf{o}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{o}_k \rangle; o_i \in \{0, 1\})$

– Enable bit (en)

Output parameters:

- Response bit (cpuf_out)

Internal variables:

- Number of PUFs in lower layer (n_1)
- Input challenge to lower layer APUF $(\mathbf{x} = \langle \mathbf{x}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{x}_{na} \rangle)$
- Input challenge to lower layer ROPUF $(x = \langle x_1, \cdots, x_{nr} \rangle)$
- Input challenge to upper layer PUF $(y = \langle y_1, \cdots, y_{n_1} \rangle)$

Structural Design:



Figure 12: Block diagram of Lightweight Secure PUF [9]

2.10 LS-PUF [9]

Primitive components:

- 1. Arbiter PUF (APUF)
- 2. XOR gate (\oplus) (used in input-output networks as shown in Fig 12)
- 3. Shift Register (SHIFTREG) (used in interconnect network to realize a one-to-one permutation of challenge bits as shown in Fig 12)

Algorithm 17: Structural Representation of LS-PUF

/*combines the input of the input network of all rows into a single input*/ Input parameters: - Number of PUF rows (Q) - Number of stages/switches in each PUF (n) - Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \ldots, c_n \rangle)$ - Enable bit (en) Output parameters: - *m* Response bits (lspuf_out = $\langle \mathbf{r}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{r}_m \rangle$) Internal variables: - Output of the interconnect network $(\mathbf{x} = \langle \mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{Q}} \rangle = \langle \langle \mathbf{x}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{1,n} \rangle, \dots, \langle \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{Q},1}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{Q},n} \rangle \rangle)$ - Output of the input network $(\mathbf{d} = \langle \mathbf{d}_1, \dots, \mathbf{d}_0 \rangle = \langle \langle \mathbf{d}_{1,1}, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{1,n} \rangle, \dots, \langle \mathbf{d}_{0,1}, \dots, \mathbf{d}_{0,n} \rangle \rangle)$ – Output of each PUF $(\mathtt{y}=\langle \mathtt{y}_1,\ldots,\mathtt{y}_m\rangle)$

```
Structural Design:
```

begin LSPUF (num Q, num n, vec c, bit en) $x = INTERCON_NETWORK (Q, c, n);$ $d = INPUT_NETWORK (Q, n, x);$ parallel i = 1 to Q do $| \mathbf{r_i} = APUF (n, d_i, en);$ end parallel lspuf_out = OUTPUT_NETWORK(Q, r); return (bit lspuf_out); end LSPUF; begin INTERCON_NETWORK (num Q, vec c, num n) $x_i = c;$ parallel i = 1 to Q - 1 do $| x_{i+1} = SHIFTREG (n, x_i, i-1);$ end parallel return (vec x); end INTERCON_NETWORK begin SHIFTREG (num n, vec c, num k) $\mathbf{s} = \langle \mathbf{s}_1, \dots, \mathbf{s}_n \rangle;$ parallel i = 1 to n do $| \mathbf{s}_{(\mathtt{i}+\mathtt{k})\%\mathtt{n}} = \mathtt{c}_{\mathtt{i}};$ end parallel return (vec s); end SHIFTREG

begin INPUT_NETWORK (num Q, num n, vec x) parallel i = 1 to Q do parallel i = to n - 1 doif j == 1 then $d_{i,(n+2)/2} = x_{i,j};$ end if else if $j\%2 \neq 0$ then $| \mathbf{d}_{\mathbf{i},(\mathbf{j}+1)/2} = \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}} \oplus \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{i},\mathbf{j}+1};$ end if else $| \mathbf{d}_{i,(n+j+2)/2} = \mathbf{x}_{i,j} \oplus \mathbf{x}_{i,j+1};$ end if end parallel end parallel return (vec d); end INPUT_NETWORK begin OUTPUT_NETWORK (num Q, vec r) /*z and s are chosen depending on the security and resource trade-off*/ parallel j = 1 to m do $y_1 = 0;$ parallel i = 1 to z do $| y_j = y_j \oplus r_{(j+s+i)\%Q};$ end parallel end parallel return (vec y); end OUTPUT_NETWORK

2.11 CRC-PUF [10]

Primitive components:

- 1. Arbiter PUF (APUF)
- 2. LFSR (FIBO_LFSR) with XOR (\oplus) and AND (and) operations
- 3. Shift Register (SHIFTREG)

Representation:

Algorithm 1	18:	Structural	Representation	of	CRC-PUF
-------------	-----	------------	----------------	----	---------

Input parameters: - Number of stages/es in each delay-chain (n) – Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_n \rangle)$ - Enable bit (en) Output parameters: - *m* Response bits (crcpuf_out = $\langle r_1, \ldots, r_m \rangle$) Internal variables: – Previous challenge bits $(t = \langle t_1, \ldots, t_n \rangle)$ – Generator polynomial coefficients $(g = \langle g_1, \dots, g_n \rangle)$ Structural Design: begin CRCPUF (num n, vec c, bit en) $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{c};$ parallel i = 1 to m do $x = FIBO_LFSR (n, x);$ $r_i = APUF (n, x, en);$ end parallel return (vec $\langle r_1, \ldots, r_m \rangle$); end CRCPUF begin FIBO_LFSR (num n, vec c) /*g(x) = generator polynomial and $g = \langle g_1, \dots, g_n \rangle = \text{coefficient vector}^* /$ $xor_poly = 0;$ parallel i = 1 to n do | $xor_poly = xor_poly \oplus (g_i \text{ and } c_i);$ end parallel c = SHIFTREG(n, c, 1); $\mathtt{c}_\mathtt{n} = \mathtt{xor_poly};$ return (vec c); end FIBO_LFSR



Figure 13: Block diagram of CRC-PUF [10]

2.12 Configurable ROPUF [11]

Primitive components:

- 1. Ring Oscillators with NOT gate (RING_OSC)
- 2. 2×1 -Multiplexer (MUX_2x1)
- 3. Counter (COUNTER)

Algorithm 19: Structural Representation of Configur	able BOPUF				
Input parameters:					
– Number of Configurable Ring Oscillators (CR0	O) (n)				
- Number of inverters in a CRO (m)					
- Challenge bits $(\mathbf{c} = \langle \mathbf{c}_1, \dots, \mathbf{c}_n \rangle)$					
– Enable bit (en)					
Output parameters:					
$- \text{Response bit } (\texttt{cropuf_out})$					
Internal variables:					
– Signal line at the input of each CRO (t)					
– Signal line at the control input of each CRO (a	s)				
- Signal line at the input of first MUX (y)					
– Signal line at the input of second MUX (z)					
- Input signal to counter (sig_in)					
- Output of first counter $(count_1)$					
– Output of second counter $(count_2)$					
Structural Design:					
$\frac{1}{1}$ begin CROPUF (num n. num m.	if $count_1 > count_2$ then				
vec c. bit en)	$ cropuf_out = 1;$				
$\mathbf{s} = \langle \mathbf{c}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{c}_m \rangle;$	end if				
parallel $i = 1$ to 2^n do	else				
$t_i = CONF_RING_OSC (m, s, en);$	$ \text{ cropuf_out} = 0;$				
$y_{1,i} = t_i;$	end if				
end parallel	return (bit cropui_out);				
$\mathbf{parallel} \ i = 2^n + 1 \ \mathbf{to} \ 2^{n+1} \ \mathbf{do}$	end CRUPUF				
$t_i = CONF_RING_OSC (m, s, en);$	hogin CONE PINC OSC (num m				
$ z_{1,i-2^n} = t_i;$ Degin CUNF_RING_USC (num m					
end parallel vec s, bit en					
serial $i = 1$ to n do $v_1 - en and v_1$, parallel $i = 1$ to $m - 1$ do					
$\begin{array}{c c} \text{parallel } j = 1 \text{ to } 2^{n} \text{ do} \\ u_{i} = -\text{MIX} 2^{n} 1 (u_{i} = u_{i} = 2); \\ nt_{1} = \text{not } t_{i}; \\ \end{array}$					
$\begin{vmatrix} y_{i+1,j} = MUX_2XI & (y_{i,2j-1}, y_{i,2j}, c_i); \\ z_{i+1,j} = MUX_2XI & (z_{i+1,j}, z_{i+1,j}, c_i); \\ nt_2 = not t_i; \end{vmatrix}$					
$\begin{bmatrix} z_{i+1,j} - MUX_2X1 & (z_{i,2j-1}, z_{i,2j}, c_i), \\ end parallel & t_{i+1} = MUX_2X1 & (nt_1, nt_2, s_i); \end{bmatrix}$					
end parallel end parallel					
$t_1 = t_m;$					
$count_{1} = COUNTER(y_{n+1,1});$ $return (bit t_{m});$					
$end CONF_RING_OSC$					



Figure 14: Block diagram of Ring Oscillator PUF



Figure 15: Configurable Ring Oscillator [11]

2.13 ColPUF [12]

Primitive components:

- 1. Congurable Ring Oscillator PUF (CROPUF)
- 2. LFSR (FIBO_LFSR)



Figure 16: Block diagram of ColPUF [12]

Algorithm 20: Structural Representation of ColPUF

Input parameters:

- Number of Configurable Ring Oscillators (CRO) (n)
- Number of inverters in a CRO (m)
- Challenge bits $(cs = \langle cs_1, \ldots, cs_n \rangle)$
- Enable bit (en)
- *Output parameters:*
 - Response bit (colpuf_out)

```
Internal variables:
```

- Signal line at the input of each CRO (t)
- Challenge generated by LFSR (c)

```
Structural Design:
begin COLPUF ( num n, num m, vec cs, bit en )
c = FIBO_LFSR (n, cs);
colpuf_out = CROPUF (n,m,c,en);
return ( bit colpuf_out );
end COLPUF
```

2.14 Secure Configuration using Bent function [13]

Primitive components:

- 1. Arbiter PUF (APUF)
- 2. Bent function (BENT_FUNC)

Representation:



Input parameters: - Number of stages/switches in Arbiter PUF (n) – Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_n \rangle)$ - Number of Arbiter PUFs (k) - Enable bit (en) Output parameters: - Response bit (bentpuf_out) Internal variables: - Response from APUFs $(y = \langle y_1, \dots, y_k \rangle)$ Structural Design: begin BENTPUF (num n, vec c, num k, bit en) begin BENT_FUNC (num k, vec y) parallel i = 1 to k do parallel i = 1 to k - 1 do $| y_i = APUF (n, c, en);$ $bf_out = bf_out \oplus (y_i \text{ and } y_{i+1});$ end parallel i = i + 2;bentpuf_out = BENT_FUNC (k, y); end parallel return (bit bf_out); return (bit bentpuf_out); end BENTPUF $\mathbf{end} \; \mathtt{BENT_FUNC}$



Figure 17: Secure PUF configuration using Bent function [13]

2.15 S_n -PUF construction using M-M Bent function [14]

Primitive components:

- 1. Arbiter PUF (APUF)
- 2. M-M Bent function (BENT_FUNC)

Representation:

Algorithm	22:	Structural	Representation	of	S_n -PUF
-----------	-----	------------	----------------	----	------------

Input parameters: - Number of stages/switches in Arbiter PUF (N) – Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_N \rangle)$ - Number of SPUFs (n) - Enable bit (en) Output parameters: - Response bit (snpuf_out) Internal variables: - Response from SPUFs $(y = \langle y_1, \dots, y_k \rangle)$ Structural Design: begin SNPUF (num n, num N, vec c, end serial num k, bit en) parallel i = 1 to n do $| y_i = SPUF (N, c, en);$ end parallel snpuf_out = BENT_FUNC (n, y); return (bit snpuf_out); end SNPUF begin SPUF (num N, vec c, bit en) cshift = 0; $y_1 = APUF (N, c, en);$ serial i = 1 to N do $cshift_i = c_{i+\frac{N}{2}};$

 $\begin{array}{l} y_2 = \text{APUF (n, chift, en)};\\ \text{spuf_out} = y_1 \text{XORy}_2;\\ \text{return (bit spuf_out)};\\ \text{end SNPUF}\\ \end{array}$ begin BENT_FUNC (num N, vec y) parallel i = 1 to N - 1 do $\mid \text{ bf_out} = \text{bf_out} \oplus (y_i \text{ and } y_{i+1});\\ i = i + 2;\\ \text{end parallel}\\ \text{return (bit bf_out)};\\ \text{end BENT_FUNC} \end{array}$



Figure 18: Block diagram of S-PUF and $S_n\mbox{-}{\rm PUF}$

2.16 Bistable Ring PUF [15]

Primitive components:

- 1. NOR gate
- 2. MUX (MUX)
- 3. DEMUX (DEMUX)

Representation:

Algorithm 23: Structural Representation of Bistable Ring PUF

Input parameters: - Number of stages in Bistable Ring PUF (n) – Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_n \rangle)$ - Reset bit (reset) Output parameters: - Response bit (brpuf_out) Structural Design: begin BRPUF (num n, vec c, bit reset) $d_1=0;\\$ serial i = 1 to n - 1 do $(t_i, b_i) = DEMUX (d_i, c_i);$ $t'_i = NOR (t_i, reset);$ $b'_i = NOR (b_i, reset);$ $\mathbf{d}_{i+1} = \texttt{MUX} \ (\mathbf{t}'_i, \mathbf{b}'_1, \mathbf{c}_i);$ end serial ${\tt d_1}={\tt d_n};$ $\mathtt{brpuf_out} = \mathtt{d_n};$ return (bit brpuf_out); end BRPUF



Figure 19: Block diagram of Bistable Ring PUF

3 Compositions of Weak and Strong PUFs

3.1 Multi-PUF (MPUF) using Pico-PUF and APUF [16]

Primitive components:

- 1. Pico PUF (PICOPUF)
- 2. XOR gate (\oplus)
- 3. APUF (APUF)

Algorithm 24: Structural Representation of MultiPU	F with Pico-PUF and APUF
Input parameters:	
– Number of stages/switches in Arbiter PUF (n))
– Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_n \rangle)$	
- Enable bit (en)	
Output parameters:	
- Response bit (multipuf_out)	
Internal variables:	
– Response from Pico-PUF (k)	
Structural Design:	havin DICODIE (hit or)
	Degin Picupur (Dit en)
begin MULIIPOF (num n, vec c,	$a_1 = ARBITER (1, en);$
Dit en)	$a_2 = ARBITER (1, en);$
parallel $i = 1$ to n do	$p_1copuf_out = NAND_LAICH(a_1, a_2);$
$\mathbf{k}_{i} = Picopor(en);$	return (bit picopui_out);
$ \mathbf{k}_i = \mathbf{k}_i \oplus \mathbf{c}_i;$	end PICUPUF
multiput out $-\Lambda DIF(n k on)$	
$multipul_out = kror(n, k, en),$	Degin NAND_LAICH (Dit a_1 , Dit a_2)
and MULTIDUE	$b_1 = \text{not } a_1 \text{ or } (a_2 \text{ and } b_1);$
end moliffor	return (bit b_1);
	end NAND_LATCH



Figure 20: Block diagram of Multi-PUF with Pico-PUF and APUF [16]



Figure 21: Block diagram of Pico-PUF [16]

4 Recurrent Composition of PUFs

4.1 Recurrent composition of DAPUF



Figure 22: Block diagram of Recurrent-DAPUF

Primitive components:

1. DAPUF (DAPUF)

2. XOR gate (\oplus)

Algorithm 25: Structural Representation of Recurrent-DAPUF

Input parameters:

- Number of stages/switches in DAPUF (n)
- Number of delay chains in DAPUF (m)
- Challenge bits $(c = \langle c_1, \dots, c_n \rangle)$

- Enable bit (en)

Output parameters:

- Response bit (r_out)

Internal variables:

- Response bits from DAPUF obtained in first iteration $(r_{int} = \langle r_{int,1}, r_{int,2}, \dots, r_{int,m} \rangle)$

```
– Internal Challenge (c_{int})
```

```
Structural Design:
```

```
serial i = 1 to k - 1 do
begin Recurrent-DAPUF ( num n, vec c, bit
                                                                          serial j = i + 1 to k do
 en )
                                                                               a^{top} = ARBITER (t_i, t_i);
                                                                               \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{h}} = \mathbf{r}_{\mathbf{h}} \oplus \mathbf{a}^{\mathtt{top}};
r_{int} = DAPUF(k, n, c, en);
                                                                               g = g + 1;
parallel i = 1 to n/m do
                                                                               if g > xor_cnt then
    parallel i = 1 to m do
                                                                               h = h + 1; r_h = 0; g = 1;
         c_{\texttt{int},(\texttt{i}-1)*\texttt{m}+\texttt{j}} = c_{\texttt{int},(\texttt{i}-1)*\texttt{m}+\texttt{j}}
         \oplus r_{int,i};
                                                                               end if
    end parallel
                                                                          end serial
end parallel
                                                                      end serial
r_{out} = DAPUF(k, n, c_{int}, en);
                                                                      serial i = 1 to k - 1 do
return ( bit r_out );
                                                                          serial j = i + 1 to k do
end Recurrent-DAPUF
                                                                               a^{bot} = ARBITER (b_i, b_i);
                                                                              \mathbf{r}_{h} = \mathbf{r}_{h} \oplus \mathbf{a}^{\texttt{bot}};
begin DAPUF ( num k, num n,
                                                                               g = g + 1;
                       vec c, bit en )
                                                                               if q > xor_cnt then
parallel i = 1 to k do
                                                                                | h = h + 1; r_h = 0; g = 1;
    \langle t_i, b_i \rangle = DELAY-CHAIN (n, en, c);
                                                                               end if
end parallel
                                                                          end serial
xor_cnt = MATH-CEIL (k * (k - 1)/m);
                                                                      end serial
q = 1; h = 1; r_{h} = 0;
                                                                      return (vec \langle r_1, \ldots, r_m \rangle);
                                                                      end DAPUF
```

5 Learnability Analysis of PUF Compositions

Several PUF architectures have been analysed in the PAC Learning framework [17,18]. Here we present the PAC learnability bounds for a recurrent composition of DAPUF, termed as Recurrent-DAPUF.

5.1 PAC Learning Analysis of Recurrent Composition of PUF

We show that a Recurrent-DAPUF can be represented using a Linear Threshold Function (LTF) and can be learned using the PAC variant of Perceptron algorithm. We then derive the PAC learnability bounds for the composition using the mistake bound of the learning algorithm. A k-chain DAPUF, taking an n-bit challenge and producing an m-bit response consists of k(k-1) arbiters whose outputs are fed into m XOR gates. Thus it is mathematically equivalent to m XOR-APUFs, each consisting of k(k-1)/m APUFs. Linear Threshold function (LTF)-based representation for XOR APUFs has been widely adopted in [19,20], and can be used to represent DAPUF as well. Analogous to PAC learning of XOR-APUF, a DAPUF represented by m independent LTFs can be learned by the PAC variant of Perceptron Algorithm. The sample complexity of the PAC learning algorithm depends on the mistake bound of the Perceptron algorithm and is given by $\mathcal{O}(1/\epsilon(log(1/\delta) + N_{mis}))$. The upper bound on the number of mistakes that can be made by the Perceptron Algorithm is $N_{mis} = (R/\epsilon)^2$ where R is the length of the transformed challenge vector ϕ and ϵ is the error bound specific to PAC model. Therefore the number of CRPs required to learn one bit of DAPUF response is $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon}\left(log(\frac{1}{\delta}) + \frac{(nd)^2(n+1)^{k(k-1)/m}}{\epsilon}\right)\right)$ where d is the discretized delay value calculated as given in [20]. In case of Recurrent-DAPUF, the challenge (c) is XORed with the intermediate response (r_{int}) obtained

In case of Recurrent-DAPUF, the challenge (c) is XORed with the intermediate response (r_{int}) obtained from the DAPUF, and fed to the DAPUF to obtain the final response. Since r_{int} is hidden, the challenge applied in the second iteration (c_{int}) gets obfuscated thereby increasing the complexity of challenge response relationship. For the analysis, we have used 5-4 DAPUF as the core PUF which takes a 64-bit challenge and returns a 4-bit response. In this composition, each response bit is XORed with 16 consecutive challenge bits. This implies that each of the 16-bit sub challenge fed to the core DAPUF is either equal to or is a complement of the corresponding part of the challenge given to the Rec-DAPUF, depending on whether the XORed response bit is 0 or 1. Thus, the challenge applied after XOR operation has either 0, 16, 32, 48 or 64 bits flipped as compared to the Rec-DAPUF input, depending on the Hamming weight of r_{int} .

Extending the response bias calculation presented in [14], we obtain the bias¹ of a single response bit of k-chain DAPUF, when b (even) consecutive challenge bits are flipped to be $\eta = \frac{1}{2} + 2^{(k(k-1)/m)-1} \left(\frac{1}{2} - \frac{2}{\pi} tan^{-1} \sqrt{\frac{b}{2n-b}}\right)^{k(k-1)/m}$, where m is the length of r_{int} . For 0, 16, 32, 48 and 64 bit flips, let us denote the corresponding response bias as $\eta_0 = 1$, η_1 , η_2 , η_3 and η_4 respectively.

With the knowledge of intermediate challenge (c_{int}) , Recurrent-DAPUF can be accurately modelled using LTF representation as described above. Since we do not have the c_{int} , we assume the intermediate challenge to be equal to Recurrent-DAPUF input c, on the same lines as given in [21]. This assumption eliminates the feedback and reduces the Recurrent-DAPUF to a DAPUF. Hence, the resultant PUF can be represented by an LTF, as we select one out of the 4 output bits. The next step is to calculate the impact of the difference in

the assumed (c) and the actual challenge (c_{int}) on the response bit (r). We estimate the impact on the final response using the response bias as explained below. Let h be the hypothesis obtained from the learning algorithm for Recurrent-DAPUF, after observing a set of labelled examples (training set) of the form (c, r). The probability that an example (c, r) (not belonging to the training set) disagrees with hypothesis h is calculated as follows:

$$Pr[h(c) \neq r] = \sum_{i=0}^{4} Pr[h(c) \neq r \mid |r_{int}| = i] \cdot Pr[|r_{int}| = i]$$

$$= \sum_{i=0}^{4} \binom{4}{i} \cdot \frac{(\epsilon \cdot \eta_i + (1 - \epsilon)(1 - \eta_i))}{16}$$

$$= \epsilon \left(\sum_{i=0}^{4} \binom{4}{i} \cdot \frac{(2\eta_i - 1)}{16}\right)$$

$$+ \left(\sum_{i=0}^{4} \binom{4}{i} \cdot \frac{(1 - \eta_i)}{16}\right) = \epsilon \cdot \eta' + \eta''$$
(1)

For this analysis, it is assumed that the distribution of r_{int} is uniform. It is to be noted that Recurrent-DAPUF returns r when core-DAPUF is given challenge c_{int} . Thus, the error of the hypothesis (h) is estimated for c_{int} and the bits differing between c_{int} and $c_{int} \oplus c$ can be considered as noise. The probability of mismatch between the predicted and actual response for a given r_{int} is the sum of two probabilities: i) probability that the predicted and actual response differ on challenge c_{int} and the bits differing between c and c_{int} do not impact the final response bit. ii) probability that $h(c_{int})$ is equal to r, however the response gets flipped due to the difference between c and c_{int} . When hypothesis h becomes equal to the target function, we have $(\epsilon = 0) \implies Pr[h(c) \neq r] = \eta''$, since error occurs only due to the difference between c and c_{int} . Thus the updated margin of the hypothesis becomes $\epsilon.\eta'$.

The maximum number of mistakes that can be made by the Perceptron algorithm is polynomial in the separation $(\epsilon.\eta')$ and is given by $N_{mis} = \left(\frac{R}{\epsilon.\eta'}\right)^2$ where $R = (n+1)^{k(k-1)/m}$ is the length of transformed chal-

¹Bias refers to the probability that the PUF response remains unchanged on modifying one or more bits of the input challenge and is denoted by η .

lenge vector and the length of weight vector corresponding to hypothesis output by the Perceptron algorithm is one. Thus the sample complexity to PAC learn Recurrent-DAPUF is $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon \cdot \eta'}\left(\log(\frac{1}{\delta}) + \frac{(nd)^2(n+1)^{k(k-1)/m}}{\epsilon^2 \cdot \eta'^2}\right)\right)$, where d is the discretized delay value and ϵ, δ are the PAC model parameters. Since $\eta' < 1$, the number of CRPs required to learn Recurrent-DAPUF is approximately $1/\eta'$ times more than DAPUF, thus proving that addition of feedback increases ML robustness.

References

- Daihyun Lim, Jae W Lee, Blaise Gassend, G Edward Suh, Marten Van Dijk, and Srinivas Devadas. Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits. *IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration* (VLSI) Systems, 13(10):1200–1205, 2005.
- [2] G Edward Suh and Srinivas Devadas. Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation. In 2007 44th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, pages 9–14. IEEE, 2007.
- [3] Jae W Lee, Daihyun Lim, Blaise Gassend, G Edward Suh, Marten Van Dijk, and Srinivas Devadas. A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits for identification and authentication applications. In 2004 Symposium on VLSI Circuits. Digest of Technical Papers (IEEE Cat. No. 04CH37525), pages 176–179. IEEE, 2004.
- [4] SV Sandeep Avvaru, Ziqing Zeng, and Keshab K Parhi. Homogeneous and heterogeneous feed-forward xor physical unclonable functions. *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security*, 15:2485– 2498, 2020.
- [5] Takanori Machida, Dai Yamamoto, Mitsugu Iwamoto, and Kazuo Sakiyama. A new mode of operation for arbiter puf to improve uniqueness on fpga. In *Fed. Conf. on Comp. Sc. and Infor. Sys.*, pages 871–878, 2014.
- [6] Durga Prasad Sahoo, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, Rajat Subhra Chakraborty, and Phuong Ha Nguyen. A multiplexer-based arbiter puf composition with enhanced reliability and security. *IEEE Transactions* on Computers, 67(3):403–417, 2017.
- [7] Phuong Ha Nguyen, Durga Prasad Sahoo, Chenglu Jin, Kaleel Mahmood, Ulrich Rührmair, and Marten van Dijk. The interpose puf: Secure puf design against state-of-the-art machine learning attacks. IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, pages 243–290, 2019.
- [8] Durga Prasad Sahoo, Sayandeep Saha, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, Rajat Subhra Chakraborty, and Hitesh Kapoor. Composite puf: A new design paradigm for physically unclonable functions on fpga. In 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), pages 50–55. IEEE, 2014.
- [9] Mehrdad Majzoobi, Farinaz Koushanfar, and Miodrag Potkonjak. Lightweight secure pufs. In 2008 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design, pages 670–673. IEEE, 2008.
- [10] Elena Dubrova, Oscar Näslund, Bernhard Degen, Anders Gawell, and Yang Yu. Crc-puf: A machine learning attack resistant lightweight puf construction. In 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops (EuroS&PW), pages 264–271. IEEE, 2019.
- [11] Abhranil Maiti and Patrick Schaumont. Improved ring oscillator puf: An fpga-friendly secure primitive. Journal of cryptology, 24(2):375–397, 2011.
- [12] B Srinivasu, P Vikramkumar, Anupam Chattopadhyay, and Kwok-Yan Lam. Colpuf: a novel configurable lfsr-based puf. In 2018 IEEE Asia Pacific Conference on Circuits and Systems (APCCAS), pages 358–361. IEEE, 2018.
- [13] On Arbiter PUFs. Security analysis of strong physical unclonable functions. 2017.

- [14] Akhilesh Anilkumar Siddhanti, Srinivasu Bodapati, Anupam Chattopadhyay, Subhamoy Maitra, Dibyendu Roy, and Pantelimon Stanica. Analysis of the strict avalanche criterion in variants of arbiterbased physically unclonable functions. In Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2019 - 20th International Conference on Cryptology in India, Hyderabad, India, December 15-18, 2019, Proceedings, volume 11898 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 556–577. Springer, 2019.
- [15] Qingqing Chen, György Csaba, Paolo Lugli, Ulf Schlichtmann, and Ulrich Rührmair. The bistable ring puf: A new architecture for strong physical unclonable functions. In 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, pages 134–141. IEEE, 2011.
- [16] Qingqing Ma, Chongyan Gu, Neil Hanley, Chenghua Wang, Weiqiang Liu, and Maire O'Neill. A machine learning attack resistant multi-puf design on fpga. In 2018 23rd Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC), pages 97–104. IEEE, 2018.
- [17] Durba Chatterjee, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, and Aritra Hazra. PUF-G: A CAD framework for automated assessment of provable learnability from formal PUF representations. In IEEE/ACM International Conference On Computer Aided Design, ICCAD 2020, San Diego, CA, USA, November 2-5, 2020, pages 48:1–48:9. IEEE, 2020.
- [18] Fatemeh Ganji. On the Learnability of Physically Unclonable Functions. Springer, 2018.
- [19] U. Rührmair, F. Schnke, J. Sölter, G. Dror, S. Devadas, and J. Schmidhuber. Modeling Attacks on Physical Unclonable Functions. In *Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, CCS '10, pages 237–249, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
- [20] Fatemeh Ganji, Shahin Tajik, and Jean-Pierre Seifert. Why attackers win: on the learnability of xor arbiter pufs. In *International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing*, pages 22–39. Springer, 2015.
- [21] Durba Chatterjee, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay, and Aritra Hazra. Interpose PUF can be PAC learned. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2020:471, 2020.