# ECC on Your Fingertips: A Single Instruction Approach for Lightweight ECC Design in GF(p)

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- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC): Computationally intensive.
- Can be accelerated by designing FPGA based accelerator.

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- Scalar multiplication: The most important operation of ECC
- Involves point doubling and point addition operations

### ECC Scalar Multiplication

#### Double-and-Add Algorithm

#### Algorithm 1: Double-and-Add Algorithm

```
Data: Point P and scalar k = k_{m-1}, k_{m-2}, k_{m-3}...k_2, k_1, k_0, where k_{m-1} = 1

Result: Q = kP

Q = P

for i = m - 2 \text{ to 0 do}

Q = 2Q (Point Doubling)

if k_j = 1 then

Q = Q + P (Point Addition)

end

end
```

- Each point doubling requires 8 field multiplications
- Each point addition requires 11 field multiplications

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- OISC has been also used to support homomorphic encryption architecture

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- RSSB (Reverse subtract and skip if borrow)
- SBNZ (Subtract the operands and branch if the answer is non-zero)

## SBN Execution

#### Table: SBN and Addition using SBN

Code 1.1 SBN: Subtract and Branch if negative	Code 1.2 Addition using SBN
SBN A,B,C	ADD C,A,B
D.Mem[A] = D.Mem[A] - D.Mem[B]	1. SBN X,X,2
if(D.Mem[A]<0)	2. SBN X,A,3
jump to C	3. SBN X,B,4
else	4. SBN C,C,5
jump to next instruction	5. SBN C,X,6

1st Operand Address	2nd Operand Address	Jump Address
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#### Figure: Instruction format of OISC




Figure: Architecture of SBN-OISC

# Switching-off Memory Write-back

Code 1.3 Field Addition using Traditional SBN	Code 1.4 Field Addition using our Modification
ADD <sub>p</sub> C,A,B	
1. SBN X,X,2	
2. SBN X,A,3	ADD <sub>p</sub> C,A,B
3. SBN X,B,4	1. $SBN_w$ X,X,2
4. SBN C,C,5	2. SBN <sub>w</sub> X,A,3
5. SBN C,X,6	3. $SBN_w$ X,B,4
6. SBN R,R,7	4. $SBN_w$ C,C,5
7. SBN R,X,8	5. $SBN_w$ C,X,6
8. SBN R,P,12	6. SBN <sub>nw</sub> C,P,8
9. SBN X,X,10	7. SBN <sub>w</sub> C,P,8
10. SBN X,R,11	8. SBN
11. SBN C,X,12	
12. SBN	

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- Shifting Key Register
- Multiplication

#### **Different SBN Instructions**

#### Table: Different Variant of SBN Instruction

Instruction	Memory Write-back	<u>,</u>		Right-shift	
SBN <sub>w</sub> mulks <sub>rs</sub>	$\checkmark$	х	х	х	
SBN <sub>nw</sub> mulksrs	x	×	×	x	
SBN <sub>nwmulksrs</sub>	x	х	$\checkmark$	х	
SBN <sub>w</sub> mulksrs	✓	×	×	√	
SBN	x	$\checkmark$	×	х	

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Instruction	Memory Write-back			Right-shift	
SBN wmulks	✓	×	x	х	
SBN <sub>nwmulksTs</sub>	x	×	x	x	
SBN <sub>nwmulksrs</sub>	x	×	$\checkmark$	х	
SBN <sub>wmulksrs</sub>	✓	×	x	√	
SBN <sub>nwmulksrs</sub>	×	$\checkmark$	×	×	

2	24	23	22	21	20	15	10
	w/ <del>nw</del>	mul/mul	ks/ks	rs/ <del>rs</del>	1st Operand Address	2nd Operand Address	Jump Address
ī	1	1	1	1	5	5	11

Figure: Modified Instruction format of SBN-OISC

#### Modular Reduction Algorithm

#### Algorithm 2: Fast Modular Reduction Algorithm for NIST P-256 Curve

**Data:** 512 bit product *C* represented as  $C = C_{15}||C_{14}|| \dots ||C_0$ , where each  $C_i$  is a 32 bit integer,  $i \in \{0, 15\}$  **Result:**  $P = C \mod P.256$   $T = (C_7||C_6||C_5||C_4||C_3||C_2||C_1||C_0)$   $S_1 = (C_{15}||C_{14}||C_{13}||C_{12}||C_{11}||0||0||0)$   $S_2 = (0||C_{15}||C_{14}||C_{13}||C_{12}||O||0||0)$   $S_3 = (C_6||C_{15}||C_{14}||C_{13}||C_{12}||C_{10}||C_0)$   $S_4 = (C_6||C_{15}||C_{14}||C_{13}||C_{11}||C_{10}||C_9)$   $D_1 = (C_{10}||C_6||0||0||0||C_{15}||C_{14}||C_{13}||C_{12})$   $D_2 = (C_{11}||C_9||0||0||C_{15}||C_{14}||C_{13}||C_{12})$   $D_3 = (C_{21}||0||C_{10}||C_6||C_6||C_{15}||C_{14}||C_{13})$  $P = T + 2S_1 + 2S_2 + S_3 + S_4 - D_1 - D_2 - D_3 - D_4 \mod P-256$ 

#### Architecture of the Multiplier




Figure: Architecture of Lightweight Field Multiplier

#### Full Processor Architecture




Figure: ECC SBN-OISC Processor Architecture

#### Result

#### Table: Area and Timing Performance of the proposed ECC SBN-OISC processor

Platform	Freq. (MHz)	Slices	LUTs	Flip- Flops	DSP for ALU	DSP for Multiplier	Block- RAM	Time (ms)
Virtex-5	171.5	81	212	35	6	2	22	11.1
Spartan-6	156.25	72	193	35	6	2	24	12.2

#### Result

#### Table: Comparison of ECC SBN-OISC Processor with Existing Designs

Reference	Slices	MULTs	BRAMs	Freq	Latency	FPGA
				(MHz)	(ms)	
Micro-ECC P-256 16 bit [1]	773	1	3	210	10.02	Virtex-II Pro
Micro-ECC P-256 32 bit [1]	1158	4	3	210	4.52	Virtex-II Pro
[2] 16 bit any prime curve	1832	2	9	108.20	29.83	Virtex-II Pro
[2] 32 bit any prime curve	2085	7	9	68.17	15.76	Virtex-II Pro
[3] P-256	1715	32 (DSP)	11	490	.62	Virtex-4
[4] P-256	221	1	3	Not shown	Not shown	Spartan-6
Present Work, P-256	81	8(DSP)	22	171.5	11.1	Virtex-5
Present Work, P-256	72	8(DSP)	24	156.25	12.2	Spartan-6

Scope of Improvement

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 Merged two design strategies to create an extremely light-weight ECC crypto-processor for scalar multiplication in NIST P-256 curve.

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- Merged two design strategies to create an extremely light-weight ECC crypto-processor for scalar multiplication in NIST P-256 curve.
- First strategy: using single instruction processor
- Second strategy: optimum usage of FPGA hard-IPs
- First implementation to reduce the slice count to less than 100.

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